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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMY P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
WILLIAM T. MAYNARD, 




NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries suffered by 
Mrs. Amy P. Johnson when her automobile was struck 
broadside by a vehicle being driven by William T. Mayn-
ard. A jury returned a verdict of ''no cause of action.'' 
The questions presented on appeal involve primarily the 
standard of care required of the driver of an authorized 
emergency vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case arose out of a traffic accident which took 
place during the noon hour (12 :18 p.m.) on the 21st day 
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of November, 1955, at the intersection of 27th Street and 
Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah, between an auto-
mobile being driven by Johnson and an Ogden City police 
vehicle (an emergency vehicle) being driven by Maynard, 
a police officer of Ogden City. (T-11, 32, 56, 81, 134, 143) 
The police vehicle driven by Maynard was equipped 
with a revolving red light, mounted on the top of the 
vehicle, which was flashing prior to the accident (T-104), 
and a siren, which was mounted on the left front fender. 
The siren was operated by a button located near the 
clutch pedal. (T-26, 30, 31, 332, 347, 351) 
At the time in question, Maynard had been on shift 
as a police officer for approximately four hours (T-42). It 
had been raining during that entire four-hour period 
(T-42), and was still raining at the time of the accident 
(T-112). The streets were wet (T-28). Maynard was 
using the windshield wipers on the police vehicle (T-28), 
and was of the opinion that motorists would have their 
\vindows closed and that hearing and visibility would be 
somewhat impaired (T-28, 29, 51, 72). 
The intersection of 27th Street and Washington 
Boulevard is in the business district of Ogden City 
(T-32), there is an apartment house on the southwest 
corner ( T -33), during the noon hour traffic increases 
(T-33), and Maynard knew that it was a rush hour (T-72). 
Prior to the accident, Johnson had been driving her 
automobile in an easterly direction on 27th Street, ap-
proaeltillg- the intersection of 27th Street and \Yashington 
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Boulevard, and Maynard had been driving the police 
vehicle in a northerly direction along Washington Boule-
vard approaching first the intersection of 28th Street and 
Washington Boulevard and subsequently the intersection 
of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard. (R-1; T -43, 49) 
Another traffic accident, not involved in this case, 
took place in Ogden City just before the accident causing 
the present dispute. According to Maynard's testimony, 
as he was driving north on Washington Boulevard ap-
proaching the intersection of 28th Street and Washing-
ton Boulevard. He had been listening to the radio com-
munications between the police dispatcher and other po-
lice officers concerning the first accident and was of the 
opinion that he would be called to assist at its scene. 
(T-49, 79, 80, 82, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90) 
Maynard subsequently did receive a radio communi-
cation from the police dispatcher instructing him to assist 
the traffic sergeant at the scene of the first accident. ( T -49, 
79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 87' 88, 89, 90) 
At the trial of the case Maynard testified that prior 
to receiving the order to assist he was asked his location 
by the police dispatcher at the time the police vehicle 
he was driving was entering the intersection of 28th 
Street and Washington Boulevard, proceeding north. 
(T-44) In a deposition taken May 29, 1956, Maynard 
testified that he gave the police dispatcher his location at 
the time that the police vehicle he was driving was passing 
through the intersection of 28th Street and Washington 
Boulevard. (T-49, 49) At the trial of the case Maynard 
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testified that in giving his location to the police dispatcher 
he said that he was ''approaching 27th Street and Wash-
ington Boulevard.'' ( T -44) 
The Fire Department of Ogden City maintains a 
radio receiver which records all Police and Fire Depart-
ment radio communications. (T-75, 76) The tape of the 
radio transmissions between the police dispatcher and 
Maynard indicates that the police dispatcher called car 
No.2 (Maynard), that Maynard answered: "go ahead," 
that the police dispatcher then asked Maynard for his lo-
cation, and that Maynard gave his location as" 27th and 
Washington.'' The word ''approaching'' does not appear 
on the tape. The police dispatcher then gave Maynard the 
location of the traffic accident at which he was to assist, 
Maynard acknowledged the order and engaged the siren, 
which is audible for just a split second on the tape. (Exh. 
B; T-79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90) 
At the trial of the case :Maynard placed the point at 
which he first engaged the siren as approximately 200 
feet north of the intersection of 28th Street and TV asking-
ton Boulez·ard T-45), and at that time he identified the 
point at which he first engaged the siren by placing a 
rectangle with a "2'' inside it on Exhibit A. (T-51) 
In his deposition .Jfaynard estimated that he first 
engaged the siren approximately 150 feet south of the in-
tersection of 27th Street and Trash iugton Boulevard. 
(T-50) 
At the trial l\faynard also testified that he took his 
foot off the siren button to shift gears approximately 
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220 feet south of the intersection of 27th Street and Wash-
ington Boulevard and then immediately re-engaged the 
siren. (T-46, 47; Exh. A, rectangle with "1" inside; 
T-341, 350) 
Several witnesses were present in and about the in-
tersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard be-
fore the siren was first audible. (T-113, 114, 117, 134) We 
will note their testimony in the Argument. 
Traffic moving through the intersection of 27th Street 
and Washington Boulevard is controlled by a traffic sem-
aphore. ( T -32) When Johnson entered the intersection 
the light was in her favor, indicating "green" or "go" 
for traffic passing through the intersection on 27th Street 
and "red" or "stop" for traffic proceeding along Wash-
ington Boulevard. (T-136, 341, 354, 359, 363) 
Johnson was traveling "not less than 5 miles per 
hour but not more than 7 miles per hour'' as she pro-
ceeded through the intersection. (T-113, 114) 
Maynard had accelerated continruous from a point ap-
proximately 220 feet south of the intersection, into the 
intersection, and up to the point of impact. (T-53) 
Approximately 30 feet before entering the intersec-
tion Maynard took his eyes off the road and looked at his 
speedometer. According to his testimony he determined 
that he was going 37 miles per hour at that time (T-359) 
Maynard entered the intersection against the ''red'' 
or "stop" light. (T-136) He had known that the light 
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would be ''red'' against him from the time he had crossed 
the intersection of 28th Street a;n.d Washington Boule-
vard, and had observed that the light was" red" against 
him on various occasions while traveling northward ap-
proaching 27th Street. (T-341, 354, 358, 359, 363) 
Maynard did not see the Johnson automobile until the 
Johnson automobile was only 4 feet in front of the police 
vehicle. ( T -53, 363) 
Maynard did not have an opportunity to apply his 
brakes or otherwise attempt to avoid the accident. (T-53, 
363) He drove the police vehicle into the right front door 
post of the Johnson automobile. (T-143) 
The point of impact took place just east of the center 
of the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boule-
vard, in the inside lane for traffic proceeding north on 
Washington Boulevard. (T-15; Exh. A, rectangles by 
traffic light at 27th and \\'" ashington) 
Johnson suffered permanent brain and facial injur-
ies as a result of the accident. {T-184, 270) Because of 
the nature of her injuries she is unable to recall any of 
the events leading up to the accident or the accident 
itself. (T-326, 327) 
ST.ATEl\IENT OF POINTS 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A 
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2. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING, OVER THE 
OBJECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF, INSTRUC-
TIONS. NUMBERS 5 AND 6 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY, OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAIN-
TIFF, THAT THE ONLY MEASURE OF CARE 
REQUIRED OF THE DRIVER OF AN AU-
THORIZED EMERGENCY VEffiCLE WAS TO 
GIVE REASONABLE WARNING OF HIS AP-
PROACH. (Instruction No.6) 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NUMBERS. 
5. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NUMBERll. 
6. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON "UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT," 
OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF. 
7. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY, OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAIN-
TIFF, ON THE DOCTRINE OF "ASSUMP-
TION OF RISK." 
8. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOC-
TRINE OF AN "ACT OF GOD." 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT' PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A 
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(A) Maynard did not observe the sta;ndard 
of care required of the driver of an 
emergency vehicle. 
It is our position that Maynard did not observe the 
standard of care required of the driver of an emergency 
vehicle, that he was therefore negligent as a matter of 
law; that Johnson was not contributorily negligent; and 
that, therefore, the court committed error in refusing to 
grant Johnson's motion for a directed verdict on the 
issue of liability. 
The standard of care required of the driver of an 
emergency vehicle is set forth in section 41-6-14, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. (Uniform Act Regu-
lating Traffic on the Highways, as amended, 1955.) That 
section grants drivers of emergency vehicles certain lib-
erties not accorded other drivers, and also imposes cer-
tain requirements if those liberties are to be exercised. 
This section of the code, as amended by the 1955 Legis-
lature, is set forth here for the convenience of the court. 
41-6-14. Applicability and Exemptions.-
( a) The provisions of this act applicable to 
the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall 
apply to the driYers of all Yehirles owned or oper-
ated by the United States, this state or any county, 
cit~~, district, or any other political subdidsion of 
the state, including authorized emergency ve-
hicles; provided, ho\\·eyer, that such authorized 
emergency Ye hieles shall be exempt from the driv-
ing restrictions imposed under sections 41-6-20 to 
and induding 4-1-6-28, 41-G-46 to and including 
41-6-8:2 and 41-6-91 to and including 41-6-106 of 
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this act when driven under the following 
conditions: 
(1) Said exemption shall apply whenever 
any said vehicle is being driven in response to an 
emergency call or when used in the pursuit of an 
actual or suspected violator of the law, or when 
responding to but not returning from a fire alarm. 
(2) Said exemption herein granted to an au-
thorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when 
the driver of any said vehicle while in motion 
sounds audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust 
whistle as may be reasonably necessary, and when 
the vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted 
lamp displaying a red light visible under normal 
atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 feet 
to the front of such vehicle. 
(b) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve 
the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle 
from the duty to drive with due regard for the 
safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions 
protect the driver from the consequences of an 
arbitrary exercise of the privileges declared in 
this section. 
(c) . " 
The exemptions granted drivers of emergency ve-
hicles are not stated in general terms, but are specifically 
set forth by listing the specific code numbers of the sec-
tions of the Act which do not apply to drivers of such 
vehicles. A summary of these exemptions is as follows : 
Sections 41-6-20 through 41-6-28 govern traf-
fic signs, signals and markings. 
Sections 41-6-46 through 41-6-52 provide for 
maximum and minimum speed limits. 
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Sections 41-6-53 through 41-6-65 govern driv-
ing on the right side of the road, passing proced-
ure, passing zones, traffic lanes, motor caravans 
and limited access highways. 
Sections 41-6-66 through 41-6-71 regulate the 
signals to be given when turning, as well as turns 
which are prohibited. 
Sections 41-6-72 through 41-6-76 regulate 
right of way among vehicles using the highways. 
Sections 41-6-77 through 41-6-82 govern pe-
destrians on the highways. 
Sections 41-6-91 through 41-6-94 regulate rail-
road crossings, trains and safety zones. 
Sections 41-6-95 through 41-6-100 regulate 
special stops. 
Sections 41-6-101 through 41-6-104 govern 
stopping, standing and parking on highways and 
signs prohibiting the same. 
Sections 41-6-105 through 41-6-106 regulate 
unattended vehicles and backing on highways. 
Thus, section 41-6-1-! by its express term serves to 
relieve drivers of authorized emergency vehicles from 
the duty to observe speed limits, heed traffic signals, stop 
signs and parking regulations, to yield the right of way, 
to drive on any specified side of the road, or to observe 
nny particular turning procedure. 
The language of the Legislature contains not the 
~lightest suggestion of a legislative intent to excuse driv-
pr~ of emergency Yehicles from any duties required by 
law, other than those specifically listed. A Carte Blanche 
10 
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is not given to the driver of such a vehicle to endanger 
life and property merely because he happens to be on an 
emergency call. His job is to assist in an emergency, 
not create an emergency. 
Thus, the exemptions listed are only granted subject 
to sub-paragraph (8) of section 41-6-14, which, for empha-
sis, we repeat : 
"The foregoing prov~swns shall not relieve the 
driver of an a.uthorized emergency vehicle from 
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety 
of all persons ... " 
Emphasis was given to the foregoing provision when 
it was re-stated in substance by the legislature in enacting 
section 41-6-76 (the section governing the duty of drivers 
<ilf other vehicles upon the approach of an emergency 
vehicle complying with the audible and visual signals 
required by the act). Paragraph (b) of section 41-6-76 
provides as follows: 
• • This section shall not operate to relieve the 
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from 
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety 
of all persons using the highway." 
Also, section 41-6-14 does not exempt the driver of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from the provisions of sec-
tion 41-6-45, paragraph (a) of which provides as follows: 
"Any person who drives any vehicle in wilful or 
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or 
property is guilty of reckless driving." 
11 
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In the case of Jensen v. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 P. 
2d 838, decided June 11, 1954, this court recognized that 
the Legislature intended that drivers of emergency ve-
hicles be required to exercise their exemptions with due 
regard for the safety of all persons. In that case this 
court said as follows: 
''The Legislature likewise added this addi-
tional limitation on the exercise of the privilege 
granted: 
'' 'The foregoing provisions shall not relieve 
the driver on an authorized emergency vehicle 
from the duty to drive with due regard for the 
safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions 
protect the driver from the consequences of his 
reckless disregard for the safety of others.' 
''To adopt the view contended for by defend-
ant would ignore completely the specific limita-
tions placed by the Legislature on the driver of an 
emergency vehicle.'' 
Section 41-6-14 was amended by the Legislature in 
1955, enlarging somewhat the exemptions granted and 
listing them by stating the specific statutes not applicable 
to drivers of emergency vehicles. ( 41-6-1±, supra) HOW-
EVER, THE PROVISION CREATING THE DUTY TO 
DRIVE WITH "DUE REGARD FOR THE SAFETY 
OF ALL PERSONS" \YAS RE-ENACTED IN THE 
STATUTE, AS AMENDED (supra), AXD \\AS ALSO 
RE-ENACTED AS PAR.AGRAPH (b) OF SECTION 
41-6-76 (supra). 
We contend that l\Iaynard, judged solely by his own 
testimony, did not operate the police Yehirle "u·ith due 
12 
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regard for the safety of all persons," in that he did not 
keep a proper or any lookout for cars in the intersection 
proceeding with a green light in their favor, and that he 
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
Maynard testified that at the time of the accident in 
question it was raining (T-42, 112), that the streets were 
wet (T-28), that he was using his windshield wipers 
(T-28), that he thought other drivers would have their 
windows closed, and that hearing and visibility would be 
somewhat impaired. (T-28, 29, 51, 72) 
He testified further that the intersection of 27th 
Street and Washington Boulevard is in the business dis-
trict of Ogden City (T-32), that traffic increases during 
the noon hour (T-33), and that he knew it was a rush 
hour. (T-72) 
He also testified that he had known from the time he 
crossed the intersection of 28th Street and Washington 
Boulevard that the light would be "red" against him at 
the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boule-
vard, and that he had in fact observed that the light was 
''red'' against him on several occasions while traveling 
northward approaching 27th Street. (T-341, 354, 358, 
359, 363) 
Knowing the atmospheric conditions and the limi-
tations on hearing and visibility, knowing that he was 
going through the business district of Ogden City dur-
ing a rush hour, and knowing that he was going to pass 
through an intersection against the ''red'' light, Mayn-
ard nevertheless testified that he commenced accelerating 
from a point approximately 220 feet south of that inter-
13 
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section and accelerated continuously until he entered the 
intersection and in fact until the moment of impact with 
the Johnson automobile. (T-53) 
Maynard also testified that he didn't even see the 
Johnson automobile until it was too late to apply his 
brakes. (T-53, 363) 
Howard Clay observed the Johnson automobile in 
the intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boule-
vard when Maynard was still approximately 176 feet 
south of that intersection. (T-113, 114, 112) Clay also 
observed that the Johnson automobile was traveling be-
tween 5 and 7 miles per hour. (T-113, 114) 
Arthur Cox observed the Johnson automobile in the 
center of the intersection of 27th Street and Washington 
Boulevard while Maynard was still approximately 100 
feet south of the south curb line of that intersection. 
(T-134, 143) Cox further observed that the Johnson au-
tomobile was traveling slowly and that it didn't travel 
more than 6 feet from the time l\Iayna.rd first sounded the 
siren until it was struck by the police vehicle. (T-134, 143) 
Clearly, the Johnson automobile was in the intersec-
tion to be seen. 
BUT MAYNARD TESTIFIED THAT HE DIDN'T 
SEE THE JOHNSON AUT01IOBILE UNTIL IT \VAS 
.JUST 4 FEET IN FRONT OF HIM. (T-53, 363) 
14 
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We are unable to pereceive how reasonable minds 
could conclude that Maynard was ''driving with due re-
gard for the safety of all persons." 
(B) Maynard did not sound his siren in time to 
reasonably warn Johnson of his approach and 
that he was going to enter the intersection 
against the red light, a;nd thus was not en-
titled to the exemptions granted a driver of a;n 
emergency vehicle. 
Section 41-6-14 grants certain exemptions to the 
driver of an emergency vehicle ''only when the driver of 
any said vehicle while in motion sounds audible signal by 
bell, siren or exhaust whistle as may be reasonably neces-
sary ... " (Section 41-6-14, supra) 
This can only be construed as meaning that the driver 
of an emergency vehicle must sound the siren in time so 
that other drivers may reasonably be expected to either 
stay out of his path or get out of his path. If this is not 
done, then the driver of an emergency vehicle is not 
granted any exemptions and is required to observe the 
same rules and regulations as the drivers of other 
vehicles. 
Thus, regardless of where Maynard testified that 
he was when he first engaged his siren, if he didn't en-
gage it in time to provide ''reasonable'' warning to other 
drivers using the highways so that they could either stay 
out of his path or get out of his path, then he enjoyed 
none of the exemptions granted the drivers of emergency 
vehicles by section 41-6-14. 
15 
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Maynard's testimony is inconsistent with itself in 
regard to the siren, and in view of this could not be be-
lieved against the overwhelming testimony of disinter-
ested witnesses. Maynard testified that the siren had not 
had time to reach maximum intensity between the time 
he re-engaged it after shifting gears until the time of the 
accident (T-46, 47). He also testified that when here-en-
gaged the siren it would have taken less than the normal 
length of time to reach maximum intensity, because the 
siren was already sounding and had already ascended 
partway toward maximum (T-351). 
The siren on the police vehicle was of the fluctuating 
type (R. 31). When first engaged it started in a low pitch 
and increased in volume to a maximum intensity. Mayn-
ard testified on one occasion that it took approxinrately 
one second for the siren to reach maximum intensity 
( T -31). On another occasion he testified that it took ap-
proximately two seconds ( T -34 7, 351). He thus should 
have reached the intersection in less than 2 seconds after 
he re-engaged the siren. 
He also testified that at the point approximately 220 
feet south of 27th Street, where he shifted gears, he was 
going approximately 30 to 35 miles per hour T-341); that 
he increased his speed by approximately two miles per 
hour before entering the intersection {T-53), and was 
going 37 miles per hour at the time he entered the inter-
section (T-342). 
Lt>Roy G. Bennett, a traffic expert and Police Lieu-
t ('llant on the Ogden City Police Department {T-148, 149), 
t(•fd ifh•d that an automobile moving at the rate of 33 
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miles per hour travels a disance of 51.33 feet in one sec-
ond, and an automobile traveling 37 miles per hour trav-
els a distance of 54.26 feet in one second. 
According to Maynard's testimony he traveled a dis-
tance of approximately 220 feet (from the time he shifted 
gears and re-engaged the siren until he entered the inter-
section of the accident) in something less than two sec-
onds (something less than the time necessary for the siren 
to reach maximum intensity). Simple mathematics indi-
cates that it is impossible to travel 220 feet in less than 
two seconds while moving at a maximum rate of 54.26 
feet per second. 
Obviously, Maynard was either mistaken as to his 
speed, which would have had to be in exceess of 80 miles 
per hour (rather than 35-37 miles per hour) or he was 
much closer to the intersection of 27th Street and Wash-
ington Boulevard than he testified he was (220 feet) when 
he re-engaged the siren. 
In view of the testimony from other disinterested 
witnesses, we believe that a properly instructed jury 
would have been compelled to find that Maynard did not 
re-engage his siren until he was within 100 feet of the in-
tersection; that during the first interval after it was re-
engaged it was at low intensity and that it did not built 
up to an intensity where Mrs. Johnson would have heard 
it until an instant before impact. This is further cor-
roborated by Maynard's own voice, which was recorded 
on the tape recorder maintained by the Fire Department 
T-75, 86). This tape reveals that he was asked to give his 
location and he stated "27th and Washington." The tape 
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shows that he was not sounding the siren as he talked. 
The siren sound started on the tape thereafter. The siren 
is audible for only a slight second on the tape (Ex. B. T. 
79-83, 87-90). 
Several persons were stationed in and about the 
intersection of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard. 
They testified as to how close the police vehicle was to that 
intersection when the siren was first audible and as to the 
length of time which elapsed from the time the siren was 
first audible until the time of impact. 
Arthur Cox was standing in Washington Boule-
vard a measured 100 feet south of the south curb line of 
27th Street. His hearing was not impaired by any type 
of enclosure. He testified that the siren was first audible 
when the police vehicle was approximately 100 feet south 
of the intersection and that from tlze time the siren was 
first audible until the time of impact the Johnson auto-
mobile did not move nwre than six feet. (T-132, 133; Exh. 
A, rectangle marked "A. C."; T-134, 143) 
Howard Clay, ·who was sitting in a parked car on the 
west side of "\V ashington Boulevard 176 feet south of the 
south curb line of ~7 Street, testified that the siren was 
not andibl e until tl1 (' pol ice 1·eh icl e wa.s 1eiflzin approxi-
mately 50 feet of the intersection of :27th Sf reef and Tr a.slz-
iupton Bnulcl'ard, and that the siren had just started at 
the time of the rrnsh. (T-11~. 113: Exh. A, rectangle 
marked "HC" at south edge of Bakery: T-113, 114, 115) 
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Fred Anderson, who was sitting in an automobile 
waiting for the "red" light at the intersection of 27th 
Street and Washington Boulevard, facing south, testified 
tha.t the siren wasn't audible until the police vehicle was 
"maybe 20 or 25, maybe 30 feet south of the intersection." 
T-116, 117) 
Lon Rothy, who was standing at the front door of the 
Park & Snack, approximately 300 feet south of the inter-
section of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard and 
who had observed the police vehicle as it passed him going 
north, testified that the siren was not going when the po-
lice vehicle passed him and that when the siren kicked 
on it "just seemed to turn about half a revolution, and 
then I heard the crash." (Exh. A; T-103, 104, 105) 
Mrs. Jerry Brenkman, who was standing at the front 
window of the Western Auto Supply Store on the north-
west corner of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard, 
testified that she glanced up immediately upon hearing 
the siren first sound and was just in time to see the acci-
dent. She said that the interval between the time the siren 
was first audible and the time of the accident was "a sec-
ond or something." (T-119, 120) 
Howard Clay also testified that the Johnson automo-
bile was moving through the intersection going east on 
27th Street at a speed of ''not less than 5 miles per hour 
but not more than 7 miles per hour." 
Police Lieutenant LeRoy G. Bennett, a traffic expert 
on the Ogden City Police Department (T-148, 149) testi-
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:tied that, assuming the coefficient of friction for wet 
asphalt and the normal reaction time of the average indi-
vidual, an automobile traveling at a speed of 5 miles per 
hour could not stop in less than 6.538 feet, an automobile 
traveling 6 miles per hour could not stop in less than 8.092 
feet, and an automobile traveling 7 miles per hour could 
not stop in less than 9.736 feet. 
Officer Bennett was asked to assume the following 
facts: 
1. That Johnson was traveling at a speed of 
from 5 to 7 miles per hour in an easterly 
direction on 27th Street. 
2. That Johnson first heard the siren at the 
time it was first audible to Cox, whose 
hearing was unimpaired by any inclosure, 
and who testified that the siren was first 
audible as it passed him as he was stand-
ing in \Y ashington Boulevard 100 feet 
south of the south curb line of 27th Street. 
(T-132, 133; Exh. A, rectangle marked 
"~l.C."; T-134, 143) 
3. That from the time the siren was first 
audible to Cox until the time of the impact 
between the police vehicle and the John-
son automobile, the Johnson automobile 
did not move more than 6 feet. (T-134, 143) 
4. That the Johnson automobile was struck 
b~· the police vehicle on the right front 
door post. (T-134, 143) 
,\HHU~IING THE ABOYE FACTS, OFFICER 
l~ENNETT TESTIFIED THAT THERE \VAS NOTH-
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ING JOHNSON COULD HAVE DONE TO A VOID 
THE ACCIDENT. (T-166, 167, 168, 169) 
We are unable to perceive how reasonable minds 
could conclude from this evidence that Maynard gave 
audible signal as was reasonable necessary to permit other 
drivers either to stay out of his path or to get out of his 
path. 
There was no affirmative evidence presented which 
would in any way indicate that Johnson was contribu-
torily negligent. In this respect we quote the New York 
court in the case of Crowley v. Fifth Ave. Coa.ch Co., 
292 N.Y.S. 473, 12 N.E. 2d 175. In that case a fire 
truck went through a red light and struck a bus. Evi-
dence showed the siren or fire bell was sounding, but the 
bus passengers did not hear it. The court said: 
"Bearing in mind the unusual set of circumstances 
with which the operator of the bus was confronted 
at the time of the collision coupled with the short 
space of time that must have elapsed immediately 
preceding this accident, we are at a loss to under-
stand how the defendant (bus driver) can be held 
responsible in negligence. If 8 of the defendant's 
passengers were unable to hear the sound of the 
siren or bell, it is fair to assume that the testimony 
of the operator was true when he stated that he 
did not hear any warning signal. r_fhe accident was 
entirely unavoidable, at least in so far as the bus 
driver was concerned. As we have seen, the lights 
were in his favor, and furthermore, he was operat-
ing the bus in a lawful manner immediately prior 
to the accident. He, as a careful prudent person 
had the right to assume that no vehicle would be 
operated against the traffic lights in an easterly 
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direction on a westbound one-way street.'' (Em-
phasis supplied) 
Because of the nature of her brain injuries Johnson 
was unable to recall any of the events leading up to the 
accident, or the accident itself. (T-326, 327) In the ab-
sence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, it must be 
presumed that she was exercising due care for her own 
safety. (Tuttle v. P. I. E., 121 Utah 420, 242 P. 2d 764; 
Lewis v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 P. 97; 
Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285; Jury In-
struction Forms, Utah, Section 16.8) Certainly, Cox, 
who was standing in the open on Washington Boulevard, 
didn't hear the siren until the police vehicle was only 100 
feet from the intersection (T-132, 133, 134, 135, 145, 146; 
Exh. A, rectangle marked "A. C."), and Anderson, who 
was seated in an automobile, facing south toward the 
approach of the police vehicle, didn't hear the siren until 
~Iaynard was ''maybe 20 or 25, maybe 30 feet south of 
the intersection.'' 
We therefore respectfully submit that the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant plaintiff's motion for a direct-
ed verdict on the question of liability for the two reasons 
discussed: 
A. Maynard did not as a rna tter of law keep a proper 
lookout. 
B. Maynard did not sound his siren in time to rea-
sonably warn Johnson that he was going to enter the in-
tersection against the ''red·' light, and thus he was not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
entitled to any of the exemptions granted by section 
41-6-14. 
PoiNT 2 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING, OVER THE 
OBJECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF, INSTRUC-
TIONS NUMBERS 5 AND 6. 
Even if the court finds against us and hold there was 
evidence for the jury on the question of whether Maynard 
was keeping a proper lookout, still the case must be re-
versed. Certainly where he testified that he did not see 
Mrs. Johnson until four feet before impact, the issue of 
keeping a proper lookout should at the very least have 
been submitted to the jury. But the trial court by Instruc-
tions 5 and 6 told the jury that Maynard did not need to 
keep a lookout for other cars. 
Instruction number 5 of the trial court's instructions 
to the jury was as follows : 
You are instructed that it is the duty of drivers of 
motor vehicles upon the public highways of this 
State to at all times exercise due care and dili-
gence in order to prevent damage to vehicles or 
injury to persons lawfully upon the highway. In-
cluded in this duty to use due care and diligence is 
the duty to constantly keep a lookout and to ac-
tually see, as well as to look for, all objects and 
things which are reasonably within the range of 
vision, and which may constitute a hazard. It is 
then a further duty after having seen, or after 
they should have seen, to use such care and dili-
gence as a reasonable and prudent person, having 
due regard to all the conditions of the highway, ob-
structions, or any other condition which may pro-
duce a hazard, would use to prevent damage or 
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injury. And in the event that a driver fails or 
neglects at any time to exercise such reasonable 
care and diligence, he is negligent. However, 
under the laws of this state there are certain ex-
ceptions to the general rule stated above, and a 
consideration of certain of these exceptions apply 
to this case, as stated in the following instruction. 
This instruction deals with but one subject-to-wit: 
the duty to keep a lookout. It tells the jury that generally a 
driver of a car must keep a lookout, but it then tells the 
jury that there is an exception to this rule. We think that 
the Utah law requires the driver of every vehicle to keep a 
lookout at all times, and that there is no exception to this 
rule. In this regard Instruction No. 5 is wrong. The error 
is emphasized by the fact that Instruction No. 6 tries to 
state the exception. Instruction 6 tells the jury that if an 
emergency vehicle is flashing a light and sounding a. siren, 
the driver need not keep a lookout, but only must adjust 
if he actually sees and realizes the danger. We contend 
this is error, too. 
Instruction number 6 discusses the exemptions grant-
ed the driver of an emergency vehicle in general terms 
by stating as follows: 
'' ... The law of this State provides that under cer-
tain conditions the driYer of an authorized emer-
gency vehicle shall be exempt from and shall not 
be required to observe certain laws that generally 
apply to the drivers of vehicles on public streets 
or highways. It will be sufficient at this time to 
8tate that the laws to which said exemption applies 
are those which regulate speed; the obserYance of 
signal lights or semaphores; or other traffic con-
trol devices; driving on the right-hand side of the 
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highway; or passing on the right side; overtaking 
and passing of other vehicles; right-of-way, turns 
and signals; stops, standing and parking. It fol-
lows that when there exists the conditions which 
said statute requires as a basis for said exemption, 
it is not negligence for the driver of such emer-
gency vehicle to disregard the rules from which 
he is thus exempted unless he is guilty of an arbi-
trary exercise of the privilege embraced in that 
exemption. . . . '' 
Subsequently, in the same instruction number 6, the 
court states as follows: 
" ... An arbitrary exercise of the privileges 
given by the aforesaid statute takes place when 
and only when the driver of an authorized emer-
gency vehicle does something which would consti-
tute negligence if he did not enjoy the exemption 
and when one or both of the two sets of circum-
stances now to be described also exist : 
(1) (This related to vehicles not on an emer-
gency call.) 
( 2) After seeing that some other person has 
not heard or heeded the warning or seeing that no 
one is in charge of property in his path that other-
wise might be moved, or seeing that there is no 
way in which any other person can reasonably be 
expected to prevent a collision, the driver of the 
emergency v'ehicle, nevertheless, having both the 
means and reasonable opportunity to avoid such a 
result, proximately causes an accident producing 
injury to another. 
The only fair meaning that can be given the language 
of instructions 5 and 6 is that the law permits an emer-
gency vehicle, when giving the appropriate audible and 
visual signals, to exceed the speed limit, drive on the 
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wrong side of the road, disregard traffic signals, rules 
of the road regarding right-of-way, passing and turns, 
but does not require that the driver look where he is 
going, and does not hold him responsible in case of acci-
dent unless he has actually seen something he could avoid 
and then deliberately runs into it. 
The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may 
proceed past a ''red'' light at any time, if he may do so 
safely. But certainly he at least has the duty to look at the 
intersection to determine if it is clear before proceeding. 
As a rna tter of fact, if a driver is to be permitted 
to disregard usual traffic regulations, to drive at great 
speeds, ignore right-of-way provisions, drive on the 
wrong side of the street, etc., he should have even a 
greater duty to look where he is going than the ordinary 
driver, under the familiar rule that the greater the dan-
ger the greater the measure of care required. (BAJI 
102-A; Klenk v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 27 Utah 428, 
76 P. 214; lllallard v. Sims. 173 Wash. 649, 24 P. 2d 70; 
Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, section 15.3) 
The 1955 amendment to the Utah "Uniform Act Reg-
ulating Traffic on Highways'' was adapted from the 
''Uniform Motor Vehicle Code,'' the adoption of which 
is being urged on all stn tes. ~Iichigan has adopted sub-
stantially the same provisions as Utah regarding the 
exemptions granted the driYers of emergenc~~ vehicles and 
the standard of care required of such drivers. In the case 
of City of Kalamazoo Y. Priest, 331 Mich. 43, 49 
N.W. 2d 52, decided September 5, 1951, the l\rfichigan court 
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had occasion to decide a case substantially identical to the 
present controversy. In its decision the court said: 
(Quote taken from the opinion of the court, 49 
N.W. 2d 54.) 
''Many duties are imposed upon the drivers of 
motor vehicles upon public streets and highways. 
Some result from express statutory requirements 
to observe certain speed limits, to stop for certain 
traffic signals and signs, or, under certain circum-
stances, to yield the right-of-way, violations of 
which constitute negligence per se. (citations) 
Other duties are inherent in the exercise of that 
due care which connotes freedom from negligence 
as defined by the courts. Among the latter are the 
duties to maintain a reasonable and proper look-
out, to see what is plainly there to be seen and 
give it due heed, and, before proceeding, from a 
suitable observation of conditions then and there 
existing to form a reasonable belief that it is safe 
to proceed. Failure to perform any of these duties 
has been held, under certain circumstances, to 
constitute contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. (citations) The above quoted statutes, relied 
on plaintiff, by their express terms serve to re-
lieve drivers of emergency vehicles only from 
those duties imposed on other drivers which re-
late to observance of speed limits, heeding traffic 
signals and stop signs, and the yielding of right-
of-way. The language of those statutes contains 
not the slightest suggestion of a legislative intent 
to excuse such drivers from the other duties men-
tioned. Had the legislature so intended, it would 
have been easy to so provide in express terms. The 
very opposite is indicated by the singling out of 
speed limits and right-of-way regulations alone 
for exemption purposes, and by the requirement in 
the selfsame statute that such vehicles must be 
driven with due regard for the safety of others. 
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''Driving a fire truck into an intersection in full 
reliance upon the right to exceed the speed limits 
and the right to proceed without stopping for the 
stop sign or the through street, but without ob-
serving or giving heed to oncoming traffic on the 
intersecting through street did not amount to driv-
ing with due regard for the safety of others as re-
quired by the statute. Such driving in reliance 
upon a statutory right-of-way has frequently been 
held to constitute contributory negligence as a 
matter of law on the part of plaintiff drivers of 
private vehicles. (Citations) Inasmuch as the 
statute has not relieved drivers of fire trucks from 
the same duties to maintain a lookout, to see and 
heed what is present to be seen, and, on the basis 
of such observation, to form a reasonable belief 
that it is safe to proceed, it follows inescapably 
that plaintiff's driver must likewise be held to 
have been guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law, barring plaintiff's right to recov-
ery." (emphasis added) 
The Utah statute sets out the exemptions granted 
drivers of emergency Yehicles in specific detail. ( 41-6-14, 
supra) There is no language in that statute which could 
be interpreted as relieving the driver of an emergency 
vehicle from keeping a lookout ahead. Drivers exceed-
ing the speed limit, driving on the wrong side of the road, 
and ignoring traffic signals certainly have a duty to look 
where they are going. 
We submit that it was error for the court, over the 
objection of plaintiff, to instruct the jury that l\faynard 
did not haYe a duty to keep a lookout ahead of the police 
vehicle if the red light was flashing and the siren 
soundi11g-. Further authority for our position in this re-
gard an' noted under our Point 3. 
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PoiNT 3 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY, OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAIN-
TIFF, THAT THE ONLY MEASURE OF CARE 
REQUIRED OF THE DRIVER OF AN AU-
THORIZED EMERGENCY VEHICLE WAS TO 
GIVE REASONABLE WARNING OF HIS AP-
PROACH. (Instruction No.6) 
Because Instruction No. 6 is rather long, we will not 
set it forth in full in our brief. Material parts of it have 
already been quoted above. The instruction taken as a 
whole tells the jury that the only measure of care re-
quired by the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle 
is to give reasonable warning of his approach and to 
adjust to things he actually sees and as to which he actual-
ly realizes the danger. Instructions 5 and 6 tell the jury 
that if an adequate warning is being given, there is an 
exception to the duty to keep a proper lookout (as noted 
above under Point 2) and from all other duty of care. This 
is contrary to the holding of our Utah Supreme Court in 
Jensenv. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196,271 P. 2nd 838, where the 
Supreme Court held that the exemptions granted to the 
driver of an emergency vehicle do not excuse him from 
exercising due care. 
It is true that our law on emergency vehicles was as 
noted above amended in 1955, but the amendments were 
not made for the purpose of changing this rule. The 
emergency vehicle is granted specific exemptions and by 
negative implication, it is required to obey all others. This 
is recognized by the instruction on emergency vehicles 
contained in the Jury Instruction Forms for Utah, pre-
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pared and edited by Mr. Justice J. Allen Crockett. See 
Instruction 25.1, subdivision two. 
There is a line of California cases which have fol-
lowed the doctrine of the trial court's instruction. Raynor 
v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal. 2d 113, 77 P.1054, 1057. 
We have been unable to find any other state which 
has adopted the California doctrine. 
Clearly the Utah Legislature did not intend that the 
sole measure of care of the driver of an emergency ve-
hicle be whether or not he had given reasonable warning. 
This Court, in the case of J en.sen v. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 
196, 271 P. 2d 838, decided June 11, 1954, so held. It con-
sidered and rejected the California doctrine. We quote 
from the opinion of the court (2 Utah 2d 200): 
''Defendant cites and relies on a line of California 
cases, construing statutes different from ours, 
which reach a result not possible under our stat-
ute, and which in our opinion would do violence 
to the legislative intent expressed therein. It may 
well be that the results which defendant contends 
for would be in the public interest, but that is 
something which the legislature and not this court 
must consider. 
''In the final analysis, defendant contends that due 
regard for the safetr of others, required by Sec-
tion 41-6-14, is satisfied if the driver of an emer-
geney vehicle has giYen the warning by siren and 
by light. In fact, the defendant contends that this 
court should adopt the Yiew expressed by the Cali-
fornia court in two cases where it uses the follow-
ing language : 
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' ... The statutes are clear that when an audi-
ble signal is given the operator of the emer-
gency vehicle has a clear right of way. The 
giving of the signal is the measure of care on 
his part, and if this is done his duty of care 
is performed .... ' (Lucas v. City of Los An-
geles, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 75 P. 2d 599, 604) ' ... 
The provisions in sections 120 and 132, supra, 
to the effect that the exemptions there given 
shall not relieve the driver of an emergency 
vehicle of the duty to drive with due regard 
to the safety of the public means that the 
driver must, 'by suitable warning, give others 
a reasonable opportunity to yield the right 
of way.' (Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10 
Cal. 2d 476, 75 P. 2d 599, 603) The sections 
also provide that the exemption shall not pro-
tect the driver from 'an arbitrary exercise' of 
the privileges there granted. But an arbi-
trary exercise of said privileges cannot be 
predicated upon th elements of speed and fail-
ure to observe other rules of the road where a 
warning has been given. 'In such cases speed, 
right of way, and all other 'rules of the road' 
are out of the picture.' (Rancor v. City of Ar-
cata, 11 Cal. 2d 113, 77 P. 2d 1054, 1957) 
"(2) The Utah Legislature by its amendment of 
the Statute in 1949 provided limitations on the ex-
emptions given firemen answering a call by au-
thorizing the emergency vehicle to proceed past 
a red stop light only when a red light is burning on 
the vehicle and the siren sounding. 
''The privilege was further conditioned by allow-
ing such operator to proceed past a red stop light 
'only after slowing down as may be necessary for 
safe operation.' 
"The Legislature likewise added this (J)dditional 
limitation on the exercise of the privilege granted: 
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'' 'The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the 
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from 
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of 
all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the 
driver from the consequences of his reckless dis-
regard for the safety of others.' 
''To adopt the view contended for by defendant 
would ignore completely the specific limitations 
placed by the Legislature on the driver of an emer-
gency vehicle.'' (emphasis added) 
See also Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Hall Funeral Home, 
68 So. 2d 626; Ruth v. Rhodes, 185 P. 2d 304 (Ariz.). 
We again quote from the case of City of Kalamazoo v. 
Priest, supra: 
''The above quoted statutes relied on by plaintiff, 
by their express terms serve to relieve drivers of 
emergency vehicles only from those duties im-
posed on other drivers which relate to observance 
of speed limits, heeding traffic signals and stop 
signs, and the yielding of right-of-way. The lan-
guage of those statutes contains not the slightest 
suggestion of a legislath·e intent to excuse such 
drivers from the other duties mentioned. Had 
the legislature so iuteuded, it zrould have been 
easy tn so provide in express terms. The very 
opposite intent is indicated by the singling out of 
speed limits and right-of-way regulations alone 
for e.TC'mption purposes, and by the requirement 
in the selfsame statute that such vehicles must 
be drirC'n U.'ith due regard for the safety of 
others.'' (emphasis added) 
It is clear that the Utah Legislature did not intend 
that the sole mcasun' of rare required of the driYer of an 
emerg-t>TH'Y \'ehicle should be whether or not a reasonable 
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warning was given. The driver of an emergency vehicle 
cannot be permitted to drive "pell mell" through a busi-
ness district of a city without regard for other motorists 
or pedestrians or for any and all traffic regulations just 
because he has a siren and a red light. 
Therefore, we respectfully submit that the trial court 
committed error in giving its instruction numer six to 
the jury, over the objection of plaintiff. 
POINT 4 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NUMBERS. 
Plaintiffs requested an instruction reading as 
follows: 
''The amount of caution used by the ordinary pru-
dent person varies in direct proportion to the dan-
ger known to be involved in his undertaking. It 
follows that in the exercise of ordinary care, the 
amount of caution required by the law increases, 
as does the danger that reasonably should be 
anticipated.'' 
That this is a correct principal of law seems beyond 
dispute. 
The compilers of the Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, 
cite two cases for this very principal of law, Klenk v. 
Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 27 Utah 428, 76 P. 214 and 
Mallard v. Sims, 173 Wash. 649, 24 P. 2d 70. The Klenk 
case holds that "negligence is the want of care required 
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by the circumstances.'' The Mallard case holds that ''neg-
ligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and pru-
dent person would ordinarily have done under the 
circumstances. '' 
In accordance with this principal of law, the com-
pilors of the aforementioned Jury Instruction forms set 
out the following instruction (section 15.3): 
"Inasmuch as the amount of caution used by the 
ordinary prudent person varies in direct propor-
tion to the danger known to be involved in his 
undertaking, it follows that in the exercise of 
ordinary care, the amount of caution required will 
vary in accordance with the nature of the act and 
the surrounding circumstances. (To put the mat-
ter in another way, the amount of caution required 
by the law increases, as does the danger that rea-
sonably should be apprehended.) 
We submit that both plaintiff's requested instruction 
number 8 and Section 15.3 of the Jury Instruction Forms, 
Utah, correctly enunciate the law. 
We further submit that according to :Maynard's own 
testimony he was driving his police vehicle on a rainy 
day, when the streets were wet, when hearing and visi-
bility would be somewhat impaired ( T-28, 29, 42, 51, 72, 
112) in the business district of Ogden City (T-32) during 
a rush hour (T-72); that whatever the standard of care 
required of the driver of an emergency vehicle, he should 
be required to use more care under such circumstances 
than if he were driving on a country road on a clear day 
with no other traffic in the vicinity; and that plaintiff was 
entitled to have the jury so instructed. 
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POINT 5 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER 11. 
Plaintiff's requested instruction number 11 reads 
as follows: 
"You are instructed that plaintiff, Amy P. John-
son, had the right to presume that no vehicle would 
be operated against the red traffic control light at 
the intersection of Washington Blvd. and 27th 
Street, and that she was not required to antici-
pate the presence of the police vehicle being driven 
by the defendant, William T. Maynard, and give it 
the right of way, unless she knew, or in the exer-
cis eof ordinary care, should havee known that 
such a vehicle was approaching.'' 
In this regard, the authors of the Jury Instruction 
Forms, Utah, stated the following proposition of law in 
section 16.12 of that work. 
''A person who is exercising due care has a right 
to assume that others will also perform their 
duties under the law, and he has a right to rely and 
act on that assumption unless, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, he observes or should observe 
something to warn him to the contrary. In the ab-
sence of any such warning, it is not negligence for 
a person to fail to anticipate injury which can 
come to him only from a violation of law or duty 
by another." 
The case of Ferguson v. Reynolds, 52 Utah 583, 176 
P. 267, is cited as authority for the above proposition. 
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Furthermore, section 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, 
provides that the exemptions therein granted to the driv-
ers of emergency vehicles are privileged only under the 
following conditions: 
( 2) Said exemption herein granted to an au-
thorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when 
the driver of any said vehicle while in motion 
sounds audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust 
whistle as may be reasonably necessary ... 
That section of the Utah code can only be inter-
preted as meaning that the driver of an emergency ve-
hicle does not enjoy any of the privileges set forth in 
41-6-14 unless he sounds his siren so as to give other 
drivers reasonable opportunity either to stay out of his 
path or to get out of his path. 
Even California, which practically gives Carte 
Blanche to the driver of an emergency vehicle, recognizes 
this principal. In the case of Balthasar v. Pac. El. Ky. 
Co., 202 P. 37, 19 A.L.R. 452, the California court states 
as follows: 
''Notice to the person required to yield the right 
of way is essential, and a reasonable opportunity 
to stop or otherwise yield the right of way neces-
sary in order to charge a person with the obligation 
fixed hr law to giYe precedence to the fire 
apparatus.'' 
And in the ense of Rogers Y. City of Los Angeles, 44 
P. 2d 465, when' an ambulance went through a red light 
and struck the plaintiff's coupe, the California court said: 
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''Unless she knew or in the exercise of ordinary 
care should have known that the ambulance was 
approaching, the plaintiff driving the coupe was 
under no obligation to anticipate its presence." 
Therefore, we respectfully submit that the court 
committed error in refusing to give plaintiff's requested 
instruction number 11. That said instruction correctly 
enunciated the law, and that plaintiff was entitled to have 
the jury consider it under the facts of this case. 
POINT 6 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON "UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENT," 
OVER THE· OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF. 
(a) There was no evidence presented in the case 
upon which a jury could base a verdict of'' un-
avoidable accident.'' 
It is the undisputed evidence in this case that Mayn-
ard was driving an emergency vehicle in a northerly di-
rection on Washington Boulevard approaching the inter-
section of 27th Street. (R-1; T-43, 49) That the inter-
section of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard was in 
the business district of Ogden, and that it was a rush 
hour. (T-32, 33, 72) That it was raining, windows were 
closed and hearing and visibility were restricted. 
(T-28, 29, 51, 72) That the light at 27th Street and 
Washington Boulevard was ''red'' against Maynard, 
and that he had known it would be "red" against him 
since crossing the intersection of 28th Street a11d Wash-
ington Boulevard, a block to the south. (T-341, 354, 358, 
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359, 363) That sometime before entering the interset-
tion of 27th Street and Washington Boulevard Maynard 
engaged the siren. ( T -341, 350) That approximately 
220 feet south of the intersection he commenced to accel-
erate and continued to accelerate into the intersection 
and up to the point of impact. (T-53) ) That Maynard en-
tered the intersection against the "red" light. (T-136) 
And that he didn't see the Johnson automobile until he 
was just 4 feet short of striking it (T-53, 363), although it 
had been in the intersection for some time and other 
witnesses had no trouble seeing it. (T-112, 113, 114, 
134, 143) 
Based on that evidence, the trial court gave the fol-
lowing instruction (over the objection of plaintiff): 
"No. 8. In law we recognize what is termed an 
unavoidable or inevitable accident. These terms 
do not mean literally that it was not possible for 
such an accident to be avoided. They simply de-
note an accident that occurred without having 
been proximately caused by negligence. 
''Even if such an accident could ha\e been avoided 
by the exercise of exceptional foresight, skill or 
caution, still, no one may be held liable for injuries 
resulting from it. 
''Even if such an accident could ha\e been avoided 
hr the use of greater foresight. caution or skill 
than was required in the circumstances in the exer-
cise of ordinary rare. still, no one may be held 
liable for injuries resulting from it. 
""\VhPthPr or not the accident in question in this 
rasP was mwYoida.ble is, of course, a question of 
fact for you to determine; and in giving the fore-
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going instruction I do not imply any opinion or 
suggestion as to what your finding should be.'' 
The cases are uniform to the effect that it is error 
to instruct on the doctrine of unavoidable accidents in 
the absence of affirmative evidence to show that the acci-
dent was in fact unavoidable. The instruction may not 
be given where the evidence leaves it to conjecture or 
surmise. In an ordinary case where, as here, plaintiff 
charges negligence and the defendant enters a general 
denial and charges contributory negligence, an instruction 
on unavoidable accidents is not proper. The cases and 
text writers are uniform in this holding. 
See for example, Rabe v. Lee (Texas), 239 S.W. 2d 
846, where the court said : 
''Appellants first contend the trial court erred 
in not submitting the issue of unavoidable acci-
dent. This collision occurred just north of the City 
of Edinburg on Highway 281 in Hidalgo County. 
Mrs. Lee was driving north on Highway 281, while 
Mrs. Rabe was proceeding south along said high-
way, and she testified that she was on her right-
hand side of the highway, or the west side of same, 
at the time of the collision. There was evidence 
tending to show that the collision occurred on the 
east or wrong side of the highway viewed from the 
standpoint of Mrs. Rabe. Appellants base their 
contention that unavoidable accident was in the 
case upon this statement: 'The jury could have 
readily believed from the evidence that the two 
cars, at about dusk, were engaged in passing other 
cars; that neither driver was negligent in attempt-
ing to pass, not having observed that the other car 
was attempting to pass; and the question present-
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ed to this court is one of a two-lane highway with 
two cars approaching from either direction, filling 
the highway on both sides, and with this hypothe-
sis in view the jury could have very well found the 
accident unavoidable.' We overrule this conten-
tion. Under the circumstances described by appel-
lants, either one or both of the drivers of the two 
cars would be guilty of negligence. Under the evi-
dence offered by appellee, the collision occurred 
on the east half of the highway when the car driven 
by Mrs. Ra be suddenly left the west half of the 
highway and ran into the car being driven by Mrs. 
Lee on her own proper side of the highway and at 
a moderate rate of speed. Mrs. Rabe testified that 
the collision occurred on her right side of the road, 
that is on the west side. All of the evidence tend-
ed to show one or the other driver guilty of neg-
ligence. There was no evidence that the act of a 
third person or something other than the negli-
gence of the drivers of the two cars caused the col-
lision. Under such circumstances the question of 
unavoidable accident is not in the case. 
There are numerous cases from many jurisdictions 
holding in accordance with this \ie-w. The matter is rather 
elaborately discussed in Williams Y. Burrell, (Ohio) 182 
NE 889, where emphasis is given to the fact that a lay 
jury is giYen ''an easy way out'' by such an instruction, 
and unless it is used ·with great caution, it is apt to be 
highly prejudicial. 
In Joh1NW11, v. 1Uacias, (5th Circuit) 193 F. 2d 4J5, 
the court noted that it would be improper to gi\e an in-
Rtruction on an uiwYoidable accident unless there was 
affirmativl' t'\·idence tending to show that plaintiff's injur-
ies rt>Rulted from some cause other than negligence on the 
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part of someone. To like effect are the following cases : 
Heuy v. Stephens, 275 P. 2d 254; Seele v. Parcell, (New 
Mexico) i1'3 P. 2d 320; Rowton v. Kemp, (Okla.) 125 P. 
2d 1003. 
The rule is noted in Blash:field, Cyclopedia of Auto-
mobile and Practice, Vol. 10 C, Section 6698. It is there 
noted: 
''A party is not entitled to an instruction on 
the theory of an unavoidable accident, in the ab-
sence of any evidence on which to base it, or upon 
pleadings not raising the issue, such as where both 
parties charge negligence in their pleadings. Also, 
where the accident could not have happened with-
out negligence or contributory negligence, it is 
error to instruct as to an unavoidable accident.'' 
Cases from numerous jurisdictions are cited in sup-
port of the rule. 
There is no evidence in the present case to show that 
either car involved was impeded or influenced by any 
mechanical failure, obstruction, or extraneous force, or 
that it resulted from some condition or act for which the 
defendant was not chargeable, or that it resulted from 
some unknown and wholly conjectural cause, or in some 
manner that cannot be explained. 
If the jury were to :find that Johnson's injuries were 
the result of an unavoidable accident its findings could 
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1111 
Adopting the language of the Ohio court in the case 
of Williams v. Burrell, supra, "We believe, also, that a 
charge on the subject of unavoidable accident should be 
used with great care and discretion, for the reason that 
in the minds of the lay jury, unfamiliar with the legal 
definition of unavoidable accident, and familiar only with 
the layman's theory of what accidents are, in the sense 
understood by the layman, it furnishes an easy way out 
for a jury to find for the defendant, losing sight of the 
real issues of the case as to whether or not there has been 
negligence, and whether or not the negligence was the 
proximate cause of the damages sustained.'' 
We therefore respectfully submit that the court com-
mitted error in instructing the jury in this case on "un-
avoidable accident.'' 
(b) No issue of "unavoidable accident" was 
raised by the pleadings, or otherwise. 
There is authority both ways on the question of 
whether or not the defense of "unavoidable accident" 
must be specially pleaded, even though there might be en-
dence on which such a charge might be based. We believe 
the weight of authority, as well as the better rule, is to the 
effect that it must be specially pleaded. 
We repeat here part of the quote from Blashfield, 
Cyclopedia of Automobile and Pra('tice, Vol. 10 C, Section 
6698, whirh was quoted in the previous section: 
''A party is not entitled to an instruction on the 
theory of an umn?oilable arrident, in the absence 
of any evidence on whirh to base it, OR UPON 
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PLEADINGS NOT RAISING THE ISSUE, 
SUCH AS WHERE BOTH PARTIES CHARGE 
NEGLIGENCE IN THEIR PLEADINGS. (note 
32, reproduced below) (emphasis added) 
Cal. Fraser v. Stellinger, 126 P. 2d 653, 52 Cal. 
App. 2d 564. 
Ga. Harper v. Hall, 46 S.E. 2d 201, 76 Ga. App. 
441. 
Ault v. Whittemore, 35 S.E. 2d 526, 73 Ga. 
App. 10. 
Ohio. Avra v. Karshner, 168 N.E. 237, 32 Ohio 
492. 
Tex. Southland Greyhound Lines v. Denrnison, 
Civ. App., 62 S.W. 2d 500." 
In the present case the pleadings did not raise the 
issue of "unavoidable accident." Johnson alleged that 
she was injured due to the negligence of Maynard. 
Maynard denied that he was negligent, and alleged that 
Johnson was injured due to her own negligence. Mayn-
ard further alleged that if he was negligence, that John-
son assumed the risk of attempting to cross the inter-
section of 27th and Washington in front of the police 
vehicle. (T-1, 2, 3, 14, 15, 16) 
The issue of "unavoidable accident' 'was not men-
tioned during the trial and no evidence was presented on 
it. That issue did not enter the trial until the jury was 
instructed by the court. 
We therefore respectfully submit that the instruc-
tion on "unavoidable accident" was error for the <Hldi-
43 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tional reason that there was no issue formulated by the 
pleadings, or otherwise, on which such an instruction 
could be based. 
PoiNT 7 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY, OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAIN-
TIFF, ON THE DOCTRINE OF "ASSUMP-
TION OF RISK." 
In its instruction number 7 to the jury the court in-
structed on the doctrine of ''assumption of risk.'' 
The doctrine of ''assumption of risk,'' in its pri-
mary or usual meaning, is limited to controversies be-
tween master and servant and is not applicable in the 
absence of any contractual relation between the parties. 
(see: 65 C.J.S. 848) 
The doctrine has been extended somewhat, but we 
have been unable to find a reported case in which the doc-
trine has been held applicable, or has even been consid-
ered, in a collision case, with the exception of ''guest'' 
cases, where the guest has been held to have assumed the 
risk of riding with the driYer or in a defective auto-
mobile, etc. 
Corpus Juris Secundum sets forth the well-known 
conditions which must exist before the doctrine of "as-
sumption of risk'' may be applied. We quote from that 
work, 65 C.J.S. 851, 852, 853: 
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"Voluntary character of exposure to risk. In or-
der to invoke the rule of assumed or incurred risk, 
it is essential that plaintiff, who exposed himself 
or his property to danger, or who continued so to 
expose himself or his property, shall have done so 
voluntarily. The doctrine, accordingly, can apply 
only where a person may reasonably elect whether 
or not he shall expose himself to a particular dan-
ger; and it has no application where a continued 
exposure to risk is due to a lack of reasonable 
opportunity to escape after the danger is appre-
ciated ... " 
''Know ledge and appreciation of danger. Also in 
order to invoke the doctrine of assumed or in-
curred risk, it is essential that the risk or danger 
shall have been known to, and appreciated by, 
plaintiff, or that it shall have been so obvious that 
he must be taken to have known and comprehended 
it .... And one is not required to anticipate that 
he will be exposed to a hazard not naturally in-
cidental to his situation, but arising from negli-
gence which he has no reason to foresee." 
''The application of the doctrine of assumed or in-
curred risk has been adjudicated with respect to 
various facts and circumstances, as where plain-
tiff participated in a dangerous sport, or joined a 
crowd of spectators knowing that they were likely 
to become unruly, or submitted to beauty shop 
treatments, etc.'' 
This court has fairly recently considered the doc-
trine of "assumption of risk" in the case of Wold v. 
Ogden City, 258 P. 2d 453. In that case this court stated 
as follows: 
''Plaintiff also is precluded, having assumed the 
risk of injury under the circumstances of this case. 
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We emphasize the fact that he knew of the hazard 
at 4 p.m. arnd at 2:30 a.m. when he 'looked this sit-
uation over.' The doctrine of assumption of risk, 
originally applicable to employer-employee rela-
tions, has been extended to some situations where 
one knows of a condition and concludes to accept 
its attendant hazards and acts accordingly with-
out force of necessity.'' (emphasis added) 
The Wold case involved an open ditch, and this court 
held that plaintiff had assumed the risk of trying to step 
over it, when he had ''looked this situation over.'' The 
opinion of the court also cited various examples of "as-
sumption of risk.'' The examples given are ''slipping on 
ice'' and ''falling through unguarded openings.'' 
It is submitted that the doctrine of ''assumption of 
risk'' is not applicable to this case, and further, that if it 
were applicable to an intersection collision, no evidence 
appears in the record on which the court could justify an 
instruction embodying its doctrine. There is no evidence 
that Johnson had "looked this situation over," that she 
knew and appreciated the danger she was incurring and 
deliberately elected to incur the known danger. Thus, 
eveh if the doctrine were applicable, the court erred in so 
instructing the jury in the absence of any evidence what-
soever on which the jury could determine that Johnson 
had in fart ''assumed the risk.'' 
PorNT 8 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOC-
TRINE OF AN "ACT OF GOD." 
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(a) The instruction on the applicability of the doc-
trine of am" Act of God" was given without 
in amy way defining that doctrine. (R-393) 
After the jury had retired to deliberate, the trial 
judge was called to the jury room and according to an 
affidavit filed by the judge, one of the jurors asked him: 
"Does an 'Act of God' apply in this case~" The trial 
judge "informed this juror and the rest of the jury that 
that doctrine had no application whatever in this case, 
and must not be considered by them in their delibera-
tions.'' (R-393) 
This question certainly suggests that the jury was 
puzzled concerning the instruction on unavoidable acci-
dent. The trial judge, according to his affidavit, told the 
jury that the doctrine of ''an act of God'' did not apply. 
However, the Judge gave no guidance to the jury what-
ever. He did not tell them what was the difference be-
tween ''an act of God'' and ''an unavoidable accident.'' 
Usually an unavoidable accident will be an act of God. 
For the Judge to tell the jury in one instruction that they 
may find this to be an unavoidable accident, and then in 
answer to their inquiry tell them that they were not to 
consider the doctrine of ''an act of God'' without dis-
tinguishing between these doctrines or defining them, cer-
tainly would leave the jury confused. 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the former 
section 104-24-14, deals with instructions to juries. Under 
the former section this court held, in the case of Smith v. 
Ca;n;naday, 45 U. 521, 529, 147 P. 210, that the trial court 
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does not discharge its duty by giving the jury mere lexi-
cal and cyclopedic definitions, and mere abstract proposi-
tions of law. How much less does the trial court discharge 
its duty of instructing the jury by merely referring to the 
title of a doctrine without even giving a lexical or cyclo-
pedic definition thereof~ 
We submit that it was error to instruct the jury on 
the applicability or non-applicability of any doctrine with-
out first defining for the jury that doctrine, and that be-
cause of the apparent confusion of the jury this instruc-
tion must be presumed to have been prejudicial to the 
plaintiff. 
(b) The instruction on the applicability of the doc-
trine of an "Act of God" was given in the 
jury room, after the jury had retired for de-
liberation, without the presence of counsel, or 
either party, or notice to counsel, and said in-
struction was not given in 1criting and was not 
taken dotcn by the reporter. (R-303) 
Rule 47 (n), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as 
follows: 
(n) Additional Instructions. After the jury have 
retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement 
among them as to any· part of the testimony, or if 
1 ht>~· desire to be informed on any point of law 
arising in the cause, the~· may require the officer 
to conduct them into court. Upon their being 
brought into court the information required must 
lw g-i ,·en in the presence of, or after notice to, the 
parties or counsel. Such information must be in 
writing or taken down hy the reporter. 
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The author, in 39 American Jurisprudence, section 
102, page 116, 117, has collected authorities on this sub-
ject. We quote from that section: 
''Most courts, however, take the position that if 
the judge enters the jury room in the absence of 
the attorneys, even at the request of the jurors, 
after they have retired to deliberate on their ver-
dict, and has any communication or conversation 
with the jury in reference to the case, a new trial 
will be granted, without consideration of the ques-
tion whether such conversation was prejudicial or 
not (citing authority); and the same is true if ad-
ditional instructions or other communications are 
sent to the jury room without the consent of, or 
notice to, parties or counsel. (citing authorities) 
In many cases it is said that injury in such cases 
will be presumed (citing authorities), and author-
ity is not wanting to the effect that this presump-
tion is conclusive. (citing authorities) Even where 
a trial judge enters the jury room at the request of 
the jurors, after they have retired to deliberate on 
their verdict, and communicate or converse with 
the jury in reference to the case, in the absence of 
attorneys (citing authorities), or sends additional 
instructions to the jury room in response to ques-
tions of the jury (citing authorities), the verdict 
should be set aside and a new trial granted. The 
trial judge should not under any circumstances 
enter the jury room, however innocent and proper 
his purpose emay be. (citing authorities) ... " 
"In some states it is provided by statute how 
and under what circumstarnces a trial judge may 
communicate with the jury, and amy communica-
tion which is not in substantial compliance with 
the statutory provisions is ground for a new trial. 
(citing authorities) (emphasis added) 
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In the instant case the jurors were not conducted into 
court, the judge entered the jury room. Counsel were 
not present and were not notified. The instruction was not 
given in writing and was not taken down by the reporter. 
{R-393) We submit that this was prejudicial error and 
adopt the language of the court of the court in the case 
of Jenss et al. v. Harrod, 166 N.Y.S. 958, where the court 
said: 
"The probity and fairness of the ... judge here 
is well known; he undoubtedly entered the jury 
room with the best of motives; but ... as to what 
he said, will not be inquired into, if he entered 
the jury room without the consent of the complain-
ing parties; for we have to depend upon his recol-
lection as to what occurred, and that might not be 
accurate; he may not have clearly expressed his 
own meaning, or the jurors may have misunder-
stood him and in afterwards relating what oc-
curred an unintentional alteration of words might 
entirely change the meaning. Unless waived, a 
party should have an opportunity to consider the 
language and effect of any communication of a 
judge to a jury.'' (see also annotations in: 22 
A.L.R. 261; 34 A.L.R. 104; 62 A.L.R. 1468; 84 
A.L.R. 230; 66 C.J.S. 58(g).) 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & :\IECHA:\1 
Attorneys for Appellan.t 
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